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ABSTRACT
The programmatic statement put forward
in von Wright’s last works on deontic logic
introduces the perspective of logical prag-
matics, which has been formally explicated
here and extended so to include the role of
norm-recipient as well as the role of norm-
giver. Using the translation function from
the language of deontic logic to the lan-
guage of set-theoretical approach, the con-
nection has been established between the
deontic postulates, on one side, and the per-
fection properties of the norm-set and the
counter-set, on the other side. In the study
of conditions of rational norm-related activ-
ities it has been shown that diverse dynamic
second-order norms related to the concept
of the consistency norm-system hold: – the
norm-giver ought to restore “classical” con-
sistency by revising an inconsistent system,
– the norm-recipient ought to preserve an in-
consistent system by revision of its logic so
that inconsistency does not imply destruc-
tion of the system. Dialetheic deontic logic
of Priest is a suitable logic for the purpose
since it preserves other perfection proper-
ties of the system.
Keywords: concepts of normativity, deon-
tic logic, logical pragmatics
In one of his later works on deontic
logic von Wright put forward a pro-
grammatic statement on its nature:
Deontic logic, one could also
say, is neither a logic of
norms nor a logic of norm-
propositions but a study of
conditions which must be satis-
fied in rational norm-giving ac-
tivity. (von Wright 1993, 111)
In this paper an outline of a formal sys-
tem will be proposed as a possible ex-
plication for the new perspective in de-
ontic logic envisaged by von Wright.
The basic idea will be to connect by
translation the axioms of standard de-
ontic logic with descriptions of “perfec-
tion properties” that a normative sys-
tem should have and to formulate corre-
sponding second-order obligations, or
requirements of rationality to which the
norm-giver is subordinated in the norm-
giving activity and the norm-recipient
in the normative reasoning, including
the corrective obligation of logic revi-
sion.
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1. Filters and ideals
In the discussion that will follow it will be assumed that actors relate to the logical
structures of the concepts of obligation and permission. Therefore the two logical
structures, the filter and the weak ideal structure, will be introduced since they will
be used in the exposition.
The set-theoretic structure that corresponds to a consistent theory or consistent
deductively closed set is called a “filter”. A filter F is defined as a set of subsets of a
given set W satisfying the following conditions (Jech 2003, 73):
1. ; /∈ F ,
2. W ∈ F ,
3. if X ∈ F and Y ∈ F , then X ∩Y ∈ F ,
4. for all X ,Y ⊆W , if X ∈ F and X ⊆ Y , then Y ∈ F .
In the case of classical propositional logic the correspondence between the sentences
of a deductively closed theory, T = C n(T ), and a filter is achieved by collecting
all the truth-sets (the sets of verifying valuations) of sentences in the theory. The
set of sets of valuations {¹ϕº | ϕ ∈C n(T )} is a filter if C n(T ) is consistent, where¹ϕº= {w | w(ϕ) = t} is the set of valuations w verifying ϕ. The filter conditions
can be reformulated in syntactic terms. To the condition 3. there corresponds
closure under conjunction since ¹ϕ∧ψº= ¹ϕº∩¹ψº. To the relation of entailment
from ϕ to ψ there corresponds an inclusion relation ¹ϕº⊆ ¹ψº. So, the syntactic
condition corresponding to condition 4. is that if ϕ ∈C n(T ) and ϕ entails ψ, then
ψ ∈C n(T ).
The intersection of all truth-sets of sentences of T , i.e.,
⋂{¹ϕº | ϕ ∈ T }, is the
semantic base of the theory C n(T ) and any truth-set contained in the filter includes
it. If the semantic base is a singleton set containing exactly one valuation w, {w}=⋂{¹ϕº | ϕ ∈ T }, then for any set X of valuations it holds that either the set X or
its complement W −X contains w. Thanks to this fact the filter is “exhaustive”: it
contains exactly one member from the pair of a set and its complement. A filter
F satisfying this condition (i.e., for any X ⊆W either X ∈ F or (W −X ) ∈ F ) is
called ‘maximal filter’ or ‘ultrafilter’. Let us note in passing that in Gödel’s theory
of properties the set of positive properties has the structure of a maximal filter.
The set-theoretic structure corresponding to the “counter-theory”, L −C n(T )
(where L is the language of T ), is closed in the opposite direction: if ¹ϕº
corresponds to some ϕ ∈ (L − C n(T )), then so does any subset of it, i.e., if
ϕ ∈ (L −C n(T )) and ¹ψº⊆ ¹ϕº, then ψ ∈ (L −C n(T )). The theory T either
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excludes some information or leaves it indeterminate, so, any truth-set contained in
the excluded or indeterminate information must belong to the set-theoretic struc-
ture corresponding to the counter-theory. The special subtype of this set-theoretical
structure is called the ‘ideal’. An ideal I is defined as a set of subsets of a given set
W satisfying the following conditions (Jech 2003, 73):
1. ; ∈ I ,
2. W /∈ I ,
3. if X ∈ I and Y ∈ I , then X ∪Y ∈ I ,
4. for all X ,Y ⊆W , if X ∈ I and Y ⊆X , then Y ∈ I .
The conditions can be reformulated in syntactic terms. To condition 3. there
corresponds closure under disjunction if both disjuncts are already in the set. To the
relation of entailment from ϕ toψ there corresponds inclusion relation ¹ϕº⊆ ¹ψº.
So, the syntactic condition corresponding to condition 4. is that ifψ ∈ (L−C n(T ))
and ϕ entails ψ, then ϕ ∈ (L −C n(T )).
Contrary to the claim put forward in (Jech 2003, 73), it does not generally hold that
an ideal is the complement of a filter, and it does not generally hold that a filter is the
complement of an ideal. Let us consider a counterexample to see that the ideal–filter
duality does not hold in general! LetL be a language of propositional logic built
over two propositional letters p and q and let W = {wpq , wp , wq , w;} be the set of
valuations where the presence of a letter in the subscript indicates that a valuation
assigns the value ‘true’ to the letter. Suppose T = {p}. Then the filter corresponding
to C n(T ) is the set F = {{wpq , wp},{wpq , wp , wq},{wpq , wp , w;},W }. Since the
theory C n(T ) is not complete, the counter-theory L −C n(T ) has both q and
¬q . If the set-theoretic structure corresponding to L −C n(T ) is an ideal, then
it will contain ¹qº∪ ¹¬qº = W , but this is not allowed by the definition of the
ideal. Therefore the complement of a filter need not always be an ideal. On the
other hand, if a theory is complete, its corresponding filter is maximal, and its
complement is an ideal.1
Although the complement of a filter needs not be an ideal, it shares an essential
property of the ideal, the property of “closure under implicants” as the first item in
Proposition 1.1 shows.
1Let I = W − F and let F be a maximal filter. To prove condition 3, suppose that ¹ϕº ∈ I and¹ψº ∈ I . So, W −¹ϕº ∈ F and W −¹ψº ∈ F and, by the set-theory, (*) W − (¹ϕº∪¹ψº) ∈ F . For
reductio suppose that ¹ϕº∪ ¹ψº /∈ I . So, ¹ϕº∪ ¹ψº ∈ F . This is impossible by (*) since F has a
non-empty intersection if it is maximal. To prove condition 4. assume that ¹ϕº ⊆ ¹ψº and (**)¹ψº ∈ I . For reductio suppose that ¹ϕº /∈ I . So, ¹ϕº ∈ F . Then, by the definition of filter, ¹ψº ∈ F ,
which is impossible because of (**).
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Proposition 1.1. If S =W − F and F is a filter, then
1. if ¹ϕº⊆ ¹ψº and ¹ψº ∈ S, then ¹ϕº ∈ S,
2. if ¹ϕº∩ ¹ψº ∈ S, then ¹ϕº ∈ S or ¹ψº ∈ S,
Proof. For 1. use reductio. Suppose ¹ϕº /∈ S. Then ¹ϕº ∈ F . Since F is closed
under superset relation, ¹ψº ∈ F . This is impossible since ¹ψº ∈ S. For 2. use
reductio. Suppose ¹ϕº /∈ S and ¹ψº /∈ S. Then ¹ϕº ∈ F and ¹ψº ∈ F . Since F is a
filter it follows that ¹ϕº∩ ¹ψº ∈ F . This is impossible since ¹ϕº∩ ¹ψº ∈ S. uunionsq
Definition 1.1 (Weak ideal). A structure S is a weak ideal iff (i) ¹ϕº ⊆ ¹ψº and¹ψº ∈ S, then ¹ϕº ∈ S, and (ii) if ¹ϕº∩ ¹ψº ∈ S, then ¹ϕº ∈ S or ¹ψº ∈ S.
2. Normative system as a set of sentences
The concept of normativity has received different explications in contemporary
philosophy. Among these the modal approach and set-theoretic approach stand
out.2 In the set theoretic approach the basic idea is to represent the normative force
by the membership relation between a propositional content ϕ and a certain set
N , “norm-set”. The expression ‘it is obligatory that ϕ’ is explicated as ‘ϕ ∈N ’.
This highly reduced model can be made more realistic by adding more variables,
such as those for the source, addressee and situation (Broome 2013, 117) and taking
‘by the source s it is obligatory in the situation w upon actor i that ϕ’ as the
elementary sentence; the elementary sentence is translated as ‘ϕ ∈ N (s , w, i)’
where the set of required propositions is the value of the three-place function
N (s , w, i). Nevertheless the basic idea remains the same. The major point of
divergence within the set-theoretic approach lies in the properties one is willing to
assign to norm-sets. For example, Alchourrón and Bulygin (1998) treat obligation
norm-sets as deductively closed sets.3 On the other hand, Broome (2013, 122)
only requires norm-sets to be closed under equivalence. Nevertheless, there are no
obstacles in treating, as will be done here, the norm-sets as simple sets consisting
just of sentences that correspond to contents of explicitly promulgated norms and
2Standard deontic logic is the KD normal modal logic having axioms (K) O(ϕ→ψ)→ (Oϕ→Oψ)
and (D) Oϕ→ ¬O¬ϕ, and the necessitation rule ` ϕ⇒`Oϕ. For the purposes of this text the
axiomatization given in (Kanger and Kanger 2001) with the rule of inheritance along entailment
relation (if ϕ entails ψ, then Oϕ→Oψ), the adjunction axiom (2) and axiom (D) is very convenient.
3Alchourrón and Bulygin (1998, 391): “We (. . . ) define the concept of a normative system as the set
of all the propositions that are consequences of the explicitly commanded propositions. (. . . ) This
enables us to distinguish between the set A (formed by all the explicitly commanded propositions)
as the axiomatic basis of the system, and the normative system C n(A), which is the set of all the
consequences of A.”.
59
EUJAP | VOL. 11 | No. 2 | 2015
to lay the question of their logical properties aside. Furthermore, it is in accord
with the approach proposed by von Wright to treat norm-sets as simple sets.
The set theoretic and modal approach need not be viewed as alternative perspectives
on the same phenomenon but rather as the two languages used in its description.
As suggested in (von Wright 1999) some deontic axioms describe the desirable
properties of a norm-set and exactly these properties the norm-giver ought to
achieve in a rational norm-giving activity. In (Žarnic´ 2010) the translation function
has been introduced for translating deontic formulas from the language without
iterated modalities to the set theoretic language and in (Žarnic´ and Bašic´ 2014)
the extension of the pragmatic reading of deontic axioms has been proposed so to
include the roles of the norm-subject and the norm-applier.
The reasons why the term ‘social pragmatics’ is used are, inter alia, the follow-
ing. The term ‘pragmatics’ indicates the study of language-use. The deontic logic
conceived along the lines of a generalized version of von Wright’s programmatic
statement (as the study of rationality conditions of norm-related activities) includes
the study of the use of language in the building of a normative system and in nor-
mative reasoning. The term ‘social’ indicates that more than one language-user
(or social role) is taken into account, and here the logical structure of normativity
will be investigated from the perspectives of the two roles, the norm-giver and the
norm-recipient role. Thus, social pragmatics of deontic logic studies the norms
that apply to norm-related activities of social actor roles. These norms can be
properly called ‘second-order norms’ since they cover the activities that are related
to a normative-system.
Definition 2.1. LanguageLO is a deontic language without iterated modalities:
ϕ ::= p | Oϕ | Pϕ | ¬ϕ | (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2), where p is a sentence of language Lp l of
propositional logic. The definitions of deontic modality F and of truth-functional
connectives are standard. LanguageLN is the language of the norm-set membership
of the set-theoretic approach: ϕ ::= p | ðpñ ∈N | ¬ϕ | (ϕ1 ∨ϕ2), where p ∈Lp l .4
Definition 2.2. Function τ+ : LO 7→ LN translates formulas of the deontic
language without iterated modalities to the language of the norm-set membership.
τ+(ϕ) = ϕ if ϕ ∈Lp l
τ+(Oϕ) = ðϕñ ∈N
τ+(Pϕ) = ð¬ϕñ /∈N
τ+(P¬ϕ) = ðϕñ /∈N
τ+(¬ϕ) = ¬τ+(ϕ)
τ+((ϕ ∨ψ)) = (τ+(ϕ)∨τ+(ψ))
4“Quine quotes”, ðϕñ, indicate that the expression ϕ is mentioned, not used. So, ðϕñ names ϕ.
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Consistency or seriality axiom (D), Oϕ→¬O¬ϕ, characterizes consistent norm-
sets as shown by the translation: τ+(Oϕ → ¬O¬ϕ) = ðϕñ ∈ N → ð¬ϕñ /∈ N .
Adjunction axiom (2), (Oϕ∧Oψ)→O(ϕ∧ψ) characterizes norm-sets closed under
conjunction as shown by the translation: τ+((Oϕ ∧Oψ)→O(ϕ ∧ψ)) = (ðϕñ ∈
N ∧ ðψñ ∈ N )→ ðϕ ∧ψñ ∈ N . It may be thought that both consistency and
closure under conjunction are desirable properties, i.e., the properties that any
norm-set ought to have, but their desirability is relative to the actor’s role. From the
perspective of the norm-giver consistency is a property that ought to be achieved in
the norm-giving activity, but closure under conjunction is not since it would involve
an infinite sequence of communicative acts of adding still another conjunction for
any pair of sentences already achieved in the process. From the perspective of the
norm-recipient consistency of a norm-set is not a property that the norm-recipient
ought to achieve in her/his normative reasoning since she/he ought to reason on
the basis of the norm-set no matter whether it is consistent or not. On the other
hand, closure under conjunction is the property related to the norm-recipient’s
reasoning since she/he ought to arrive at the minimal (non-redundant) conjunctive
conclusion of her/his obligations.
Axiom (K), O(ϕ → ψ) → (Oϕ → Oψ), in the presence of the necessita-
tion rule characterizes deductively closed norm-sets as shown by the translation:
τ+(O(ϕ → ψ) → (Oϕ → Oψ)) = ðϕ → ψñ ∈ N → (ðϕñ ∈ N → ðψñ ∈ N ).
Alternatively but in the same direction, the related property of closure under en-
tailment is characterized by the rule of deontic inheritance if ϕ entails ψ, then
Oϕ→Oψ; this could be a more convenient solution since it does not require that
the norm-set has all the logical truths. Extending the line of thought to the Roman
Law principle (ultra posse nemo obligatur, impossibilium nulla obligatio) and intro-
ducing the operator Canr for “doability” or the recipient’s r ability to see to it that
so-and-so is the case, Oϕ→ Canrϕ, it is clear that the principle characterizes doable
norm-sets as shown by the translation: τ+(Oϕ→ Canrϕ) = ðϕñ ∈N → Canrϕ.
It is obligatory for the norm-recipient to draw deductive consequences of explicitly
stated norms and not obligatory for the norm-giver to proclaim them. So, only
from the norm-recipient’s perspective the deductive closure ofN is its perfection
property, i.e., in normative reasoning she or he ought to relate to the deductively
closed set, and not only to its deductive core. On the other hand, the Roman Law
principle seems to allow for both interpretations: it is clear that the norm-giver
ought to achieve a “doable” norm-set, but is disputable whether the norm-recipient
is licensed to conclude that a norm is not binding if its content is not doable or
under obligation to revise her/his theory of doability.
From the point of view of social pragmatics the identity of the actor’s role (with
respect to the norm-set) must be taken into account in the analysis of a logical
phenomenon. It can be said that the roles relate to the same concept of obligation,
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conceived as the membership of a sentence in the norm-set, but their perspectives
differ and thus reveal different properties of the norm-set. From the perspective
of the norm-giver role the consistency of the norm-set appears as s normative
property, the property that ought to be achieved in the norm-giving activity. On the
other hand, from the perspective of the norm-recipient consistency is a descriptive
property that the norm-set either has or has not. Similarly, but reversely, the
property of closure under entailment is a normative property from the norm-
recipient’s perspective since any deductive consequence of the norm-set ought to
be accepted in the norm-recipient’s normative reasoning. As noted in the example
from (Goble 2009), no defence for camping on a street on Thursday can be built
on the ground that there is only a norm prohibiting camping on a street on any
day of week but no explicit norm regarding Thursday. The reason being that the
norm-recipient in his normative reasoning ought to relate to the norm-set as being
deductively closed. The norm-giving activity does not relate to the closure property
since there can be no empirical object corresponding to the deductively closed
norm-set as it is necessarily infinite.
Suppose that one wants to add Pϕ → Oϕ as an axiom and thus ex-
clude optionality. The axiom characterizes frames where accessibility re-
lation is functional, ∀x∀y∀z((Rxy ∧ Rx z) → y = z). The translation
τ+(Pϕ → Oϕ) = ð¬ϕñ /∈ N → ðϕñ ∈ N shows that the axiom characterizes
complete norm-sets. If the language ofN is rich enough to express its own syntax
then a finite N cannot be complete. So, in this case completeness cannot be a
desirable property of a finite norm-set if one accepts the third order norm that a
property is desirable only if it is logically possible. If so, then the semantic structure
corresponding to deductively closed set cannot be an ultrafilter.
3. Non-conceptual connections between obligations and permissions
In this section an extension of the set-theoretic approach will be proposed in order
to capture von Wright’s non-derivative concept of permission, i.e., permission
and obligation are not interdefinable. So, besides the norm-set created by explicit
obligation-norms, another set is required in the model, namely, the one which is
built by permission-norms.
Just as possibility is the negation of the necessity of the contradictory
of a proposition, permission is the negation of the obligatoriness of the
contradictory. P p↔¬O¬p is a theorem of “classical” deontic logic.
I think that this opinion is mistaken. The relation between permission
and absence of prohibition is not a conceptual but a normative relation.
One may be able to give good reasons why such things which are not
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prohibited by the norms of a certain code should be regarded as permitted
by the code in question. But to declare the non-prohibited permitted
is a normative act. One could have a meta-norm to the effect that the
not-prohibited is permitted. The well-known principles Nulla poena sine
lege and Nullum crimen sine lege may be thought of as versions of this
meta-norm. Or at least as closely related to it. (von Wright 1991, 179)
If permission is not the absence of prohibition, what is it? Several answers have
been discussed in the literature. An incomplete list follows with an additional
proposal at the end:
• To give a permission is to remove an antecedently existing prohibition.
• Giving permission to an actor to see to it that something is the case implies
prohibiting any other actor to prevent her/him from doing so.
• To give a permission means to declare that something is optional. To give a
permission for ϕ means to simultaneously introduce two permission-norms:
Pϕ and P¬ϕ.5
Here the disputes on the meaning/s of ‘permission’ will be set aside; so it will be
taken in its weakest non-derivative sense.
In order to capture the concept of permission in a non-derivative sense, the “counter-
set”,N , will be introduced in the model. Within the two-sets model the scope of
“perfection properties” becomes wider. Besides perfection properties of individual
sets, there are also perfection properties of the relation between them. Gaplessness is
one of these.
Let L be the language in which the norm-system is formulated. Norm-system
〈N ,N 〉 is gapless iffN ∪N =L . The operation corresponding to the introduc-
tion of a permission-norm is the addition of the contradiction of its content to the
counter-set: ð¬ϕñ is added toN if Pϕ, ðϕñ is added toN if P¬ϕ. Considering the
case of Pϕ, the reason for this is that ð¬ϕñ under τ+ is not inN if Pϕ, and, since
the system is gapless, ð¬ϕñ must be put intoN . So, there are two correspondences
in a gapless system: 1. Oϕ corresponds to ðϕñ ∈N , and 2. Pϕ (P¬ϕ) corresponds
to ð¬ϕñ ∈N (ðϕñ ∈N ).
5If the norm-giver proclaims Pϕ, then her/his intending and not proclaiming Oϕ would violate
Gricean maxim of quantity, while the norm-recipient would be justified by the logic of cooperative
communication to conclude that ¬Oϕ and therefore P¬ϕ.
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3.1. Two types of inconsistency
“Relational (or external) inconsistency” occurs ifN ∩N 6= ;. An example with
Pϕ ∧O¬ϕ is given in Figure 1. “Inner inconsistency” occurs if {ψ,¬ψ} ⊆N for
some ψ. An example with Oψ∧O¬ψ is given in Figure 1.
A BNorm-setN Counter-setN
¬ϕψ¬ψ
Figure 1: An example depicting a gapless but “doubly inconsistent” normative system. It is externally
inconsistent since the intersection is non-empty, and internally inconsistent since the norm-set
contains a pair of contradictory sentences.
Let us assume that norm-system 〈N ,N 〉 actually has “relational perfections” that
it ought to have:
• that it is gapless,N ∪N =L ,
• that it is externally consistent,N ∩N = ;.
Figure 2 depicts a norm-system having the two relational perfections.
A BNorm-setN Counter-setN
Figure 2: An example depicting a gapless and externally consistent system.
If the two relational perfections are present, translation function τ− will give
descriptions of properties of the counter-set that correspond to deontic postulates.
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POSTULATE OF STANDARD
DEONTIC LOGIC
NORM-SET PROPERTY COUNTER-SET PROPERTY
(D) Oϕ→ Pϕ consistency completeness
(2) (Oϕ ∧Oψ)→O(ϕ ∧ψ) closure under
conjunction
having at least one conjunct for
each conjunction contained
(K) axiom together with
necessitation rule
deductive closure “closure under implicant” (if ϕ
entails ψ and ψ ∈N , then ϕ ∈N )
Table 1: The correspondence of set properties in a gapless and externally consistent norm-system.
Definition 3.1. Function τ− : LO 7→ LN translates formulas of the deontic
language without iterated modalities to the language of the counter-set membership.
τ−(ϕ) = ϕ if ϕ ∈Lp l
τ−(Oϕ) = ðϕñ /∈N
τ−(Pϕ) = ð¬ϕñ ∈N
τ−(P¬ϕ) = ðϕñ ∈N
τ−(¬ϕ) = ¬τ−(ϕ)
τ−((ϕ ∨ψ)) = (τ−(ϕ)∨τ−(ψ))
Consider some examples! (D) axiom, Oϕ→¬O¬ϕ, characterizes complete counter-
sets as shown by the translation: τ−1(Oϕ→¬O¬ϕ) = ðϕñ /∈ N → ð¬ϕñ ∈ N .
Adjunction axiom (2), (Oϕ ∧Oψ)→O(ϕ ∧ψ), characterizes counter-sets having
at least one conjunct for any conjunction they contain as shown by the translation
(which makes use of the law of contraposition): τ−1((Oϕ ∧Oψ)→O(ϕ ∧ψ)) =
ðϕ ∧ψñ ∈N → (ðϕñ ∈N ∨ ðψñ ∈N ). The counter-set property corresponding
to (K) axiom is the property of being “downwardly” closed, i.e., closed under the
affirmation of consequent, τ−(O(ϕ → ψ)→ (Oϕ → Oψ)) = ðϕ → ψñ ∈ N →
(ðψñ ∈N → ðϕñ ∈N ).
The translations, summarized in Table 1, show the following fact: if the norm-set
and the counter-set are identified with set of truth-sets of their respective elements,
then the resulting pair of structures will consist of a filter, {¹ϕº | ϕ ∈N }, and a
weak ideal, {¹ϕº | ϕ ∈N }.
The social roles variedly relate to descriptive and normative properties of the norm-
set. An actor’s relation to a normative property can be conceptualized in terms of
second-order norms. For example, the fact that consistency is a normative property
65
EUJAP | VOL. 11 | No. 2 | 2015
(perfection property) for the norm-giver generates the second-order norm for the
norm-giving activity: the norm-giver ought to build a consistent norm-set. Taking
into account the two-sets model introduced here and the correspondence between
perfection properties of the two sets, this line of thought should be extended in
order to cover the permission-norm giving activity. So, the corresponding second-
order norm with respect to the counter-set would be: the norm-giver ought to build
a complete counter-set. But unlike consistency this property cannot be achieved
since it would involve an infinite sequence of communicative-acts on the side of
the permission-norm giver. So, is the completeness of the counter-set a normative
property for the norm-giver or not? There are two ways for the norm-giver to
achieve the completeness of the counter set: either by proclaiming that everything
not forbidden is permitted or, vice versa, that everything not permitted is forbidden.
This proclamation, or the “sealing legal principle” (Mastop 2011), would represent
a meta-norm giving activity. In the two-sets model the sealing of the system can
be performed in two ways. For the purpose of permitting the non-forbidden the
following condition does the job: if ðϕñ /∈C n(N ), then ðϕñ ∈N . In the direction
of forbidding the non-permitted the under-determinacy reigns and the resulting
systems can be radically different.
4. Social pragmatics of inconsistency
The thesis of this paper is that second-order norms come in two types. The already
discussed first type concerns the relation of the norm-giver and the norm-recipient
towards the perfection properties of a norm-system in norm-giving and in normative
reasoning. The second type is corrective and covers relations towards an imperfect
norm-system. If the norm-giver has created an inconsistent normative system, then
there is a “corrective obligation” for her/him: the norm-giver ought to restore
consistency by the revision of its content (by derogations, modifications, . . . ). On
the other hand, the norm-recipient ought to continue to reason on the basis of an
inconsistent normative system, but it obviously cannot be done using classical logic
where the principle ex contradictione quodlibet holds.6 Therefore, in absence of other
remedies, the second-order norm for the recipient’s dealing with an inconsistent
system requires the shift to an inconsistency-tolerant logic.7 In other words, the
6In classical logic the presence of contradictory sentences in the premises destroys the proof by
making every sentence provable, their presence in the theory destroys its descriptive power by
making no interpretation possible, their presence in the discourse destroys communication by
making it impossible to reach understanding. According to Tarski’s (1956) theory of consequence
relation (C n : ℘L 7→ ℘L ) there must exist a sentence whose consequence is the whole of the
language (L ). Tarski’s Axiom 5 states this property as follows: there is a sentence x such that
C n({x}) =L .
7The requirement of changing logic seems to be a too radical solution, as has been noted by Jorge
Rodriguez in the discussion at A Workshop on Deontic Logic, Milano. Instead of logic change he
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norm-giver should revise the content and the norm-recipient should revise the logic
of an inconsistent system, cf. Figure 3.
inconsistent
norm-system
norm-giver norm-recipient
ought to
revise the
norm-system
ought to change
the logic of
normative
reasoning
content
revision
logic
revision
Figure 3: Corrective obligations with respect to an inconsitent normative-system.
The normative relation is different for each actor-role: the norm-giver ought to
change the content of the normative system so to remove inconsistency, the norm-
recipient ought to change the logic of in reasoning from the inconsistent normative
system to its consequences. These second-order “dynamic” norms show the need
of a notion of revision more general than that of AGM-revision (Alchourrón et al.
1985). The generalized notion of revision must be wide enough to encompass the
case where revision includes no contraction but, instead, takes the form of the
change of logic. Since a presence of contradiction in a set of sentences need not
imply the absurdity of using this set in reasoning the two “imperfections” should
be distinguished:
• the inconsistency, either internal {ψ,¬ψ} ⊆N or externalN ∩N 6= ;, and
• the self-destruction (“anti-coherence”) under logic L, where either C n(L,N ) =
L or C n(L,N ∪{ϕ}) =L for some ϕ of which Pϕ holds.8
4.1. Restoration and preservation conditions of logic revision
Let us make explicit, as has been done above, the logic defining particular conse-
quence relation by introducing a place for it within the binary function C n(L,A).
has proposed a restricted type of normative reasoning in which the destructive effect is localized.
Nevertheless, to change some of the “structural properties” of a consequence relation means to
change the logic. It will be shown infra how the destructive effect of a contradiction can be localized
while preserving consequence relations elsewhere within the deontic dialetheic logic.
8This means that ¬ϕ ∈N or, if ϕ = ¬ψ, then ψ ∈N .
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The notion of “anti-coherence” will be used here alongside the notion of consis-
tency since some logics, such as dialetheic logic, are paraconsistent or “inconsistency
tolerant” meaning that inconsistency of set does not entail its self-destruction or
anti-coherence. In this case the revision cannot be understood in the way of AGM
theory as consistency restoration. As previously stated this type of revision does not
affect the content but only the form: it is the change of logic such that inconsistency
will become divorced from anti-coherence. The revision without contraction can be
understood as the change from the classical logic CL, where {ϕ,¬ϕ} ⊆C n(CL,N )
implies C n(CL,N ) =L to a non-classical logic NCL, where C n(NCL,N ) 6=L .
The consequence relation C n in a logic L is a functional relation from a subset to a
subset of the same language, C n :℘L 7→℘L . The revisionN [L/L∗] of a setN
by changing logic from L to L∗ is the deductive closure of the set under the logic
L∗ : N [L/L∗] = C n(L∗,N ).
The first condition that a logic change ought to satisfy is to restore a desirable logical
property of the system being revised. In the first place, the change of logic ought
to restore coherence of the set whose logic is being changed. IfN is inconsistent
and incoherent in classical logic, thenN [CL/NCL] results in an inconsistent but
coherent set, {ϕ,¬ϕ} ⊆N [CL/NCL] but C n(NCL,N ) 6=L . Secondly, the change
of logic ought to preserve desirable logical properties. Applying the preservation
condition to the two-sets model of normative system, it is the perfection properties
of the norm-set and the counter-set that ought to be saved. The two conditions of
the logic revision, restoration condition and preservation condition, resemble the
content contraction, but the difference lies in the fact that instead of consistency
it is the coherence that is being restored, and, instead of maximal preservation
of the content, it is the desirable logical properties that are being saved. So, the
norm-recipient faced with an inconsistent normative system ought to adopt an
inconsistency-tolerant logic under which the normative properties will be preserved,
namely, closure under entailment and adjunction of the norm-set together with
correlated properties of the counter-set (closure under implicants and closure under
having at least one conjunct for each conjunction). Is there such a logic?
5. Dealing with normative inconsistency
As stated above, it is not the norm-giver’s duty to change the logic, this is the
norm-recipient’s duty. The norm-recipient’s duty remains the duty to treat the
norm-system as a “logical object” (with the norm set closed under entailment and
adjunction, and the counter-set having corresponding properties). But can this
be done? Is there a logic not self-destructive in the case of inconsistency and still
conservative with respect to “perfection properties” of the norm-set and counter-set?
The answer is affirmative. Dialetheic deontic logic of Graham Priest (2006) both is
68
B. Žarnic´ | A Social Pragmatic View on the Concept of Normative Consistency
inconsistency-tolerant and preserves properties of the norm-set and counter-set.
The notion of consistency of a normative-system is not the same notion as con-
sistency of a theory. For example, the difference between external and internal
consistency has no counterpart in the domain of descriptive theories. Theory as a
set of sentences is semantically consistent if there is an interpretation that makes
true every sentence in the set. This notion corresponds to internal consistency, i.e.,
consistency of the norm-set but, as will be shown below, the normative consistency
is much more demanding than this. Let us further refine the set-theoretical model
and treatN (w)⊆L as a function that delivers obligations for situation w, and
similarly for N (w) ⊆ L . In this model the conditional obligation ‘if ϕ, then
Oψ’ is interpreted as ‘if ϕ is the case in situation w, then ðψñ ∈ N (w)’. Since
contraposition holds the conditional ‘Oψ only if ϕ’ can be read as ‘if ¬ϕ, then
¬Oψ’, and then, using the way of thinking connected with translation function
τ−, the following translation can be obtained: ‘if ¬ϕ, then ψ ∈N ’. This approach
reveals the highly demanding character of normative consistency: a normative
system is strongly consistent if it provides a legal way out of any possible situation.
The definition of strong consistency in the two-sets model 〈N ,N 〉 follows.
Definition 5.1. Normative-functions system 〈N ,N 〉 is strongly consistent iff for
all w bothN (w) is consistent andN (w)∩N (w) = ; holds.
Example 5.1. Suppose that the following holds: (i) if ϕ1 is the case in a situation w,
then ðψñ ∈N (w), and (ii) if ϕ2 is the case in a situation w, then ð¬ψñ ∈N (w). Is
it permitted for the norm-recipient to conclude thatN has no normative force if
the situation where ϕ1 ∧ϕ2 holds is possible? Nevertheless, the norm-set functionN might be inconsistent with respect to ϕ1 ∧ϕ2-type of situations and consistent
with respect to all other types of situations.
What is rational for a norm-recipient to infer regrading a normative-function sys-
tem that is not strongly consistent? How far-reaching is the destructive power of
contradiction: if the norm-set functionN delivers an inconsistent set in w and a
consistent set in any other case, does “anti-coherence” under classical logic at w,
N (w) = L , give reason to abandon N at v where set N (v) is coherent? The
same questions arise regarding the external consistency: does the fact of external
inconsistency in some situation w (i.e., N (w) ∩N (w) 6= ;) give the reason to
abandon the whole normative-functions system?
It is not only irrational to throw away a system because of its inconsistency in some
possible situation, which as a matter of fact might never occur. It is also beyond
the power of the norm-recipient to do so (unless the same person plays the role
of the norm-giver and the norm-recipient). Rather, from the perspective of the
norm-recipient the normative inconsistency arising in some situation shows that
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the normative system has entered its unstable phase, as depicted in Figure 4, and it
is solely in these situations that the corrective obligation of changing the logic of
normative reasoning applies to the norm-recipient. So, the norm-recipient must
apply a special deontic logic that can function in an unstable phase. Is there a logic
not self-destructive in the case of inconsistency and still conservative with respect to
“perfection properties” of the norm-set and counter-set? The answer is affirmative.
Dialetheic deontic logic of Graham Priest (2006) is both inconsistency-tolerant and
preserves perfection properties of the norm-set and counter-set and therefore can
function as the logic of normative instability.
. . .
Stable phase at w:
N (w) is consistent
and
N (w)∩N (w) = ;.
Unstable phase at w ′:
N (w ′) is not consistent
or
N (w ′)∩N (w ′) 6= ;.
Stable phase at w ′′
. . .
Figure 4: An exemplar sequence of phases of a normative system.
5.1. Dialetheic deontic logic
In this subsection a short presentation and a slight modification of the dialetheic
deontic logic will be given and it will be shown how aptly it fits to the purpose
of providing an inconsistency tolerant yet perfection properties preserving logic.
The subsection ends with a short appendix addressing the question of expressive
incompleteness of dialetheic deontic logic.
Priest (2006) presents the system of dialetheic deontic logic, a logic with three values.
A contradiction within a system formulated in the language of dialetheic deontic
logic does not cause its destruction. From the point of view of deontic pragmatics
this is a desirable property since the norm-recipient as such does not have the power
to revise the content of a norm-set. In an unstable phase the norm-recipient does
not cease to be subordinated to the norm set. The second order obligation to reason
on the basis of the normative system still holds and the only way to find a legal way
out is to change its logic and not its content.
Dialetheic logic provides a natural extension of the semantic definitions of classical
logic so that the expressions “is true” and “is false” are replaced by “has truth” and
“has falsity”. A sentence can have truth or falsity in itself, or both. Slightly departing
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¬
{t} {f}
{t, f} {t, f}
{f} {t}
∧ {t} {t, f} {f}
{t} {t} {t, f} {f}
{t, f} {t, f} {t, f} {f}
{f} {f} {f} {f}
∨ {t} {t, f} {f}
{t} {t} {t} {t}
{t, f} {t} {t, f} {t, f}
{f} {t} {t, f} {f}
Table 2: The semantic definitions for the truth-functional (extensional) connectives in dialetheic
logic.
from the notation of (Priest 2006) the three values of dialetheic logic will be denoted
here by {t}, {t, f}, {f}.9
Priest’s dialetheic semantics for truth-functional connectives (cf. Table 2) is easy
to remember since its definitions for ¬, ∧ and ∨ can be obtained from the classical
definitions by replacing “α is true (false)” by “α has truth (falsity)”, i.e., by replacing
the values in the valuation v as follows: v(α) = t and v(α) = f by t ∈ v(α) and
f ∈ v(α). One can also think of dialetheic valuations as a special case of “classical
valuations” since negation inverts the order, conjunction picks the lowest value,
and disjunction picks the greatest value of the two with respect to the given order:
{f}< {t, f}< {t} (order)
v(¬ϕ) =
¨{t, f}− v(ϕ) if v(ϕ) ∈ {{t},{f}},
{t, f} otherwise. (¬)
v(ϕ ∧ψ) = mi n(v(ϕ), v(ψ)) (∧)
v(ϕ ∨ψ) = max(v(ϕ), v(ψ)) (∨)
A contradiction (α∧¬α) can be both true and false if and only if α is both true and
false and ¬α is both true and false, cf. Table 3. The alleged slogan of dialethism
states that “there are true contradictions”, but this does not mean that there can be
a contradiction that “bears no falsity on its face”.
α ∧ ¬α
{t} {f} {f}
{t, f} {t, f} {t, f}
{f} {f} {t}
Table 3: Possible values of a contradiction.
The dialetheic entailment α→d β with the respect to the real world is defined in
(Priest 2006, 190) as it being the case that it is necessary (relative to the real world)
that the truth is inherited from left to right and falsity form right to left.
9In order to preserve closeness to the natural language reading of the formulas the original expressions
{1}, {1,0}, {0} of Priest have been replaced by {t}, {t, f}, {f} with the intended reading ‘has truth
only’, ‘has both truth and falsity’, ‘has falsity only’.
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. . . a necessary condition for entailment is truth preservation from an-
tecedent to consequent. Truth preservation may not, on its own, be
sufficient, however. For not only do we use the fact that something is
entailed by true sentences to prove it, but we use the fact that something
entails false ones to refute it. Thus, we require an entailment to preserve
falsity from consequent to antecedent too. Of course, classically, truth
preservation forwards and falsity preservation backwards go together.
(Priest 2006, 84)
Priest extends the semantics to capture the meaning of the entailment operator
→d . The initial languageLtf has the syntax α ::= p | ¬α | (α1 ∧α2), where p ∈At
and At is the set of atomic sentences. The languageLtf→ has the syntax ϕ ::= α |
(ϕ1→d ϕ2), where α ∈Ltf. An interpretation M is the tuple 〈W ,G, R, v〉 where
W 6= ;, G ∈W with the intended meaning of G being the real world, R⊆W ×
W , {G} ×W ⊆ R, v is a valuation function from W ×At into {{t},{t, f},{f}}.
The shorthand notation for v(w,α) is vw(α). The semantic definitions for truth-
functional connectives are the same as in Table 2. The definition for the entailment
connective is an intensional one:
• t ∈ vw (α→d β) iff for all w ′ such that Rww ′:
– if t ∈ vw ′(α), then t ∈ vw ′(β), and
– if f ∈ vw ′(β), then f ∈ vw ′(α),
• f ∈ vw (α→d β) iff for some w ′ such that Rww ′, t ∈ vw ′(α) and f ∈ vw ′(β).10
(Priest 2006, 85) defines the semantic consequence relation as follows: “Σ |= α iff
for all interpretations, M , it is true of the evaluation, v, that if 1 ∈ vG(β) for all
β ∈ Σ then 1 ∈ vG(α)”. Modus ponens {α,α→d β} |= β is not valid and since
“modus ponens is a sine qua non of any implication connective” (Priest 2006, 86)
Priest adds the condition that any world is accessible from G (“omniscience of G”),
i.e. {G}×W ⊆ R, which implies RGG and that is sufficient for validity of modus
ponens.
Priest’s semantic definition of the ‘entailment conditional’ ultimately reduces to
left-to-right truth inheritance and right-to-left falsity inheritance in all valuations.
The reason for this is that in examining the existence of consequence every model
must be taken into account and, so, every valuation point must take the role of G
10In (Priest 2006, 85) the definition is given differently: instead of wRw ′ there appears w ′Rw, which
implies that the valuation vw depends on valuations at worlds w
′ from which w is accessible, not
those which are accessible from w. This non-standard definition seems to be a typographical error
which reappears elsewhere but is not consistent with non-formal readings given in the text.
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in some model; since every valuation point is accessible from G, the valuation of a
conditional depends on all valuations. Therefore, for any valuation points w and w ′
it holds that if w = G in M and w ′ = G in M ′, then vw(α→d β) = vw ′(α→d β).
The relational semantics of→d with valuation function having two places, the one
for a world and the other for a sentence, can be reduced to the test of validity of
left-to-right truth inheritance and right-to-left falsity inheritance within the space
of valuation semantics, where valuation is a one-place function. So, for the purpose
of this text an alternative Definition 5.2 is proposed below.
Definition 5.2 (Alternative definition of→d ). The entailment conditional α→d β
has truth in a valuation v, t ∈ v(α→d β), iff for any valuation v ′ it holds that: (i)
if t ∈ v ′(α), then t ∈ v ′(β), and (ii) if f ∈ v ′(β), then f ∈ v ′(α). The entailment
conditional α →d β has falsity in a valuation v, f ∈ v(α →d β), iff for some
valuation v ′ it holds that: t ∈ v ′(α) and f ∈ v ′(β).
With the basic notions at hand we can move to deontic dialetheic sentential logic.
Priest gives the informal reading for Oα as follows: “. . . if the world were such
that all extant obligations were duly fulfilled, then it would be the case that α”
(Priest 2006, 189). The language domain in Priest (2006) is the whole propositional
language, with truth-functional connectives and the intensional entailment operator
→d , and, so, it includes, besides norm-contents in the proper sense, also the truths
of logic. Since the content of proper norms is some doable state of affairs, the
language under consideration can be reduced to its truth-functional partLtf→ and
thus the following non-formal interpretation can be proposed. The extension
ω+(w)⊆L covers the range of obligatory and neccessary sentences, sentences about
that which is either obligatory or inevitable in the situation w. The anti-extension
ω−(w)⊆L covers the range of forbidden and optional sentences, sentences about
that which is either non-permitted or that which is permitted and negation of
which is also permitted in the situation w. Priest takes that at any w the extension
and anti-extension are exhaustive ω+(w) ∪ω−(w) = Ltf→, but not necessarily
exclusive.
Definition 5.3 (The syntax of the languageLdd of dialetheic deontic logic.). Let
ϕ be a sentence ofLtf.
α ::= ϕ |Oϕ | ¬α | (α1 ∧α2). (1)
Fϕ is an abbreviation for O¬ϕ. Pϕ is an abbreviation for ¬O¬ϕ.
The semantics of deontic dialetheic logic interprets the deontic operator O at a
world w as the pair of extensionω+(w) and anti-extensionω−(w).
Definition 5.4. An extensionω+(w)⊆Ltf→ at w is a set of sentences such that
73
EUJAP | VOL. 11 | No. 2 | 2015
• ω+ is closed under dialetheic entailment: if α entails β and α ∈ω+(w), then
β ∈ω+(w),
• ω+ is closed under adjunction: if α ∈ω+(w) and β ∈ω+(w), then (α∧β) ∈
ω+(w).
Definition 5.5. An anti-extension ω−(w)⊆Ltf→ at w is a set of sentences such
that
• ω−(w) is reversely closed under dialetheic entailment (closed under “affirma-
tion of consequent”): if α entails β and β ∈ω−(w), then α ∈ω−(w),
• ω−(w) contains at least one conjunct for any conjunction it has: if α∧β ∈
ω−(w), then α ∈ω−(w) or β ∈ω−(w).
Condition 1. The extension and anti-extension are exhaustive at any w: ω+(w)∪
ω−(w) =Ltf→
Definition 5.6. Valuation vw (Oϕ) of a sentence Oϕ in a situation w:
• t ∈ vw (Oϕ) iff ϕ ∈ω+(w),
• f ∈ vw (Oϕ) iff ϕ ∈ω−(w).
Example 5.2. The valuations for Fϕ and Pϕ follow from Definition 5.6 and matrices
from Table 2. E.g., t ∈ vw (Pϕ) (iff t ∈ vw (¬O¬ϕ) iff f ∈ vw (O¬ϕ)) iff¬ϕ ∈ω−(w);
f ∈ vw (Pϕ) (iff f ∈ vw (¬O¬ϕ) iff t ∈ vw (O¬ϕ)) iff ¬ϕ ∈ω+(w). The comparison
of the dialetheic definition with the set-theoretic translations for Pϕ, ð¬ϕñ /∈N
and ð¬ϕñ ∈ N , shows a structural similarity. If ¬ϕ /∈ ω+(w), then, thanks to
exhaustivity ofω+(w)∪ω−(w), it must be the case that¬ϕ ∈ω−(w) and that is the
condition for vw(Pϕ) to “contain the truth”. On the other hand, if ¬ϕ ∈ω+(w),
then this is the condition for vw (Pϕ) to “contain the falsity”.
It is obvious that Priest’s “extension” and “anti-extension” not only correspond
to the norm-set and counter-set, respectively, but also share their interconnected
perfection properties with respect to closure under entailment and adjunction, cf.
Table 1 supra. It is also clear that if each sentence is replaced with its truth-set, see
Definition 5.8 and Proposition 5.5 below, then the resulting set of truth-sets for
sentences from the extension will be a filter, while the resulting set of truth-sets for
sentences from the anti-extension will be a weak ideal. In addition to this the relation
between the two sets also has a perfection property, namley “gaplessness”. It is
only the perfection property of consistency that is lacking, or rather “consistencies”
since there are two of them, the internal and external.
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w ::= SUBSETS OF ω+(w)∪ω−(w) VALUATION vw
ω+(w)−ω−(w) ω+(w)∩ω−(w) ω−(w)−ω+(w) Oϕ Fϕ Pϕ P¬ϕ
w1 ϕ,¬ϕ {t} {t} {f} {f}
w2 ϕ ¬ϕ {t} {t, f} {t, f} {f}
w3 ϕ,¬ϕ {t, f} {t, f} {t, f} {t, f}
w4 ϕ ¬ϕ {t, f} {f} {t} {t, f}
Table 4: Varieties of inconsistent normative systems. Firstly, note that the presence of contradictory
sentences in ω−(w) is not a sign of inconsistency, but the indication of the fact that ϕ is optional.
The sufficient conditions for inconsistency are the presence of contradictory sentences inω+(w) and
ω+(w)∩ω−(w) 6= ;. Secondly, note the absence of “deontic explosion”. In each of the inconsistency
types it is not the case that “anything goes”, not everything is permitted. In w1 nothing is permitted
with respect to ϕ. In w2 it is only “partially permitted” that ϕ. In w3 the inconsistency reaches
its highest point and both ϕ and ¬ϕ are simultaniously permitted and not permitted. In w4 it is
permitted that ϕ and permitted and not permitted that ¬ϕ, and, so, ϕ is both optional and not
optional.
Example 5.3. The characteristic axiom schema of deontic logic is (D) Oϕ→ Pϕ.
(D) axiom fails if the extension ω+(w) is inconsistent. Consider for example
interpretations depicted in Table 4! In w1 it is obligatory but not permitted that ϕ
since vw1(Oϕ ∧Pϕ) = {f}. In w2 the situation is similar but in a “weaker” sense,
vw2(Oϕ∧Pϕ) = mi n({t},{t, f}) = {t, f}; if axiom (D) is read in the sense of dialetheic
entailment, then it is invalidated in w2 since there is no “preservation of falsity from
consequent to antecedent”. In w3 the amount of “true contradictions” is the highest
and ϕ is there both obligatory and not, both forbidden and not, both permitted
and not. In w4 ϕ is both non-optional and optional.
There are two types of inconsistency: (i) inconsistentω∗(w) or, in the terminology
of this article, internal inconsistency, e.g., in w1, w2, w3 in Table 4, and (ii) non-
empty intersection of ω+(w) and ω−(w) or external inconsistency, e.g. w2, w3,
w4 in Table 4. The linguistic construction of ω
+(w) is straightforward: if the
norm-giver proclaims that Oϕ for situation w, then ϕ ∈ω+(w). The construction
of ω−(w) is more complicated. A permission is read out of the counter-set, if
¬ϕ ∈ ω−(w), then ϕ is permitted in w. If in addition to this it also holds ϕ ∈
ω+(w), then ϕ is also not permitted in w, creating thus a deontic contradiction.
The norm-giver’s proclamation of a permission-norm Pϕ (P¬ϕ) for a situation w
is equated with the addition of ¬ϕ (ϕ) to the anti-extension.
Concluding remarks on deontic dialetheic logic It is stunning how accurately
deontic dialetheic logic fits the need of logic revision on the side of the norm-
recipient. The shift to deontic dialetheic logic in an unstable phase of the normative
system fully satisfies restoration and preservation conditions of logic revision, cf.
subsection 4.1. Nevertheless, there is a price for this and it takes the form of the
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increase of uncertainty. Proposition 5.4 below shows that the language of deontic
dialetheic logic is not expressively complete (in the sense of Definition 5.10). The
consequence of this fact is an unavoidable measure of uncertainty in normative
reasoning. If the norm-recipient arrives at the conclusionϕ it does not mean that any
state v ∈ ¹ϕº is acceptable since some of these might be excluded by other norms.
The only way to solve the problem of safety in normative reasoning is to arrive at
some sentence ψ which leaves no space for a possible defeat (with respect to a finite
number of atomic descriptions). The truth-set of such a sentence is a singleton,
|¹ϕº| = 1, but this would be possible only in the case of the fully inconsistent
state represented by the valuation v{t,f} which assigns both truth and falsity to any
sentential letter, cf. Proposition 5.3. But this is exactly what a normative system
does in its unstable phase of inconsistency: it forces the norm-recipient into a
quandary.
5.2. Appendix
Concerning the language Ltf
Definition 5.7. A valuation set W for a set of sentential letters At is the set of all
functions from At to the set of semantic values {{t},{t, f},{f}}.
Definition 5.8. The intension ¹ϕºW of a sentence ϕ within a valuation set W is
the set of valuations where v(ϕ) = {t} or v(ϕ) = {t, f}: ¹ϕºW = {v ∈W | t ∈ v(ϕ)}.
Proposition 5.1. ¹ϕ ∧ψºW = ¹ϕºW ∩ ¹ψºW ; ¹ϕ ∨ψºW = ¹ϕºW ∪ ¹ψºW
Definition 5.9. Valuation v{t,f}W is the valuation that assigns {t, f} to all sentential
letters.
Proposition 5.2. For any sentence ϕ, v{t,f}W (ϕ) = {t, f}.
Proof. By induction. In the basic case it holds for any sentential letter p that
v{t,f}W (p) = {t, f}. In inductive step assume that less complex formulas ϕ andψ satisfy
the condition v{t,f}W (ϕ) = {t, f} and v{t,f}W (ψ) = {t, f}. Then by the definitions of truth-
functional connectives, v{t,f}W (¬ϕ) = {t, f}, v{t,f}W (ϕ∧ψ) = {t, f}, v{t,f}W (ϕ∨ψ) = {t, f}.uunionsq
Proposition 5.3. Any sentence ϕ has v{t,f}W in its intension ¹ϕºW .
Proof. Use Proposition 5.2 and Definition (5.8). uunionsq
Corollary 1. For all ϕ, if {v{t,f}} 6= ¹ϕº, then 1< |¹ϕº|.
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Proof. Suppose that ¬1< |¹ϕº|. Then either (i) 0 = |¹ϕº| or (ii) 1 = |¹ϕº|. Both
the first and the second are impossible since v{t,f} is any intension. uunionsq
Corollary 2. ¹ϕº∩ ¹¬ϕº 6= ;
Definition 5.10. The language L of a sentential logic is expressively complete
with respect to the set W of valuations iff far any set a ⊆W of valuations there is a
sentence ϕ ∈L the intension of which is identical to the set a = ¹ϕº.
Proposition 5.4. The languageLtf is not expressively complete with the respect to the
set W of valuations of dialetheic semantics.
Proof. Use Corollary 2. uunionsq
Concerning the language Ltf→
Lemma 5.1. For any v and v ′, v(ϕ→ψ) = v ′(ϕ→ψ).
Proof. It has to be proved that for any v and v ′, if t ∈ v(ϕ→ψ), then t ∈ v ′(ϕ→ψ),
and if f ∈ v(ϕ → ψ), then f ∈ v ′(ϕ → ψ). This is an immediate consequence of
Definition 5.2. uunionsq
Proposition 5.5. ¹ϕ→ψº=W or ¹ϕ→ψº= ;.
Proof. From Lemma 5.1 it follows that if there is a valuation v such that v ∈ ¹ϕ→
ψº, then for any valuation v it holds that v ∈ ¹ϕ→ ψº. So, if there is a v such
that v ∈ ¹ϕ→ ψº, then ¹ϕ→ ψº= W . If for some v, v(ϕ→ ψ) = {f}, then, by
Lemma 5.1, v ′(ϕ→ψ) = {f} for any v ′. Therefore, ¹ϕ→ψº= ;. uunionsq
Proposition 5.6. If vw (p) = {t, f} for all propositional letters, then for any ϕ ∈Ltf→,
if ¹ϕº 6= ;, then vw (ϕ) = {t, f}.
Proof. Use induction. The basic case ϕ ∈Ltf holds by Proposition 5.2. Assume
inductive hypothesis: vw(ϕ) = {t, f} and vw(ψ) = {t, f}. Consider ϕ→d ψ. From
Definition 5.2 and inductive hypothesis it follows that f ∈ vx for any x ∈ W ,
i.e., t ∈ vw(ϕ) and f ∈ vw(ψ). ¹ϕ→ ψº= W from Proposition 5.5 and the main
assumption. So, on one side, as established, f ∈ vx(ϕ → ψ) for any x ∈W , and,
on the other side, t ∈ vx(ϕ→ ψ) for any x ∈W by the Definition 5.8. Then, by
universal instantiation, vw(ϕ→ψ) = {t, f} The cases for ¬, ∧ and ∨ are similar as
in the proof of Proposition 5.2.
uunionsq
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